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Abstract—Millions of shipping containers filled with goods
move around the world every day. Before such a container may
enter a trade bloc, the customs agency of the goods’ destination
country must ensure that it does not contain illegal or mislabeled
goods. Due to the high volume of containers, customs agencies
make a selection of containers to audit through a risk analysis
procedure. Customs agencies perform risk analysis using data
sourced from a centralized system that is potentially vulnerable
to manipulation and malpractice. Therefore we propose an
alternative: DEFEND, a decentralized system that stores data
about goods and containers in a secure and privacy-preserving
manner. In our system, economic operators make claims to
the network about goods they insert into or remove from
containers, and encrypt these claims so that they can only be
read by the destination country’s customs agency. Economic
operators also make unencrypted claims about containers with
which they interact. Unencrypted claims can be validated by
the entire network of customs agencies. Our key contribution
is a data partitioning scheme and several protocols that enable
such a system to utilize blockchain and its powerful validation
principle, while also preserving the privacy of the involved
economic operators. Using our protocol, customs agencies can
improve their risk analysis and economic operators can get
through customs with less delay. We also present a reference
implementation built with Hyperledger Fabric and analyze to
what extent our implementation meets the requirements in terms
of privacy-preservation, security, scalability, and decentralization.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s economy, many countries have specialized in
producing certain goods: the Netherlands grows the most
tulips, China assembles iPhones, and Honduras is the biggest
producer of coffee [1]. These exports are consumed by people
all over the world, so millions of containers full of goods move
in and out of the world’s ports every day [2].
Before any goods may enter a trade bloc, they must be
cleared by the relevant customs agency. The customs agency
at the destination country of the goods taxes the goods, and
attempts to prevent forbidden goods from entering their trade
bloc. However, customs agencies are only able to audit on the
order of 1% of incoming containers due to the high volume
of containers they are processing [3]. Therefore, customs
agencies must determine which small portion of the containers
to examine.
To decide which containers to examine, the customs agen-
cies estimate for each container the risk that it is carrying
illegal or mislabeled goods. Customs agencies audit those
containers with the highest estimated risk. This risk analysis
depends heavily on the available data and its quality and
reliability.
In a typical scenario, there are two types of parties involved.
The economic operators move goods in and out of containers
and move containers around the world. The customs agencies
need reliable data on these goods and container movements for
their risk analysis calculations. The economic operators create
data about their goods and containers, and customs agencies
consume that data. The transfer of data from economic oper-
ator to customs agency in the current system is based around
a bill of lading.
A bill of lading is an aggregate of information about all
the goods on a single shipment of containers coming into a
port. It is created by the economic operator in charge of that
shipment, and sent to the relevant customs agency at least 24
hours before the ship arrives in the port. This system has three
major shortcomings:
• The bill of lading does not tell a customs agency through
which other ports a container of goods may have traveled.
• The bill of lading is an aggregation, so it is not the
original source of data.
• The bill of lading is only required to be received 24 hours
before a ship’s arrival.
These shortcomings make it more difficult for customs
agencies to predict which containers must be audited.
A naive solution to this problem would be to create a central
trusted authority that collects data from all economic operators
from the various online locations where it is available [4].
Such a centralized system exist: ConTraffic, a “web-based
geographical information system enabling interactive visual-
ization of container movements” collects data by mining public
data repositories of economic operators [5]. This centralized
approach has several drawbacks. A central authority could
alter the data, and could decide to exclude or mistreat specific
economic operators. Therefore, such a centralized system
requires trust, which cannot be expected of all economic
operators and customs agencies in the world.
These security concerns raise the need for a decentralized
system, in which involved parties put their trust into a system
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rather than an organization. This system should enable
different, mutually untrusted entities to collaborate and be
privacy-preserving, secure, scalable, and decentralized.
We propose a decentralized system named DEFEND: a se-
cure and privacy-preserving DEcentralized system for Freight
Declaration, which enables economic operators and customs
agencies to collaborate in an environment that does not require
centralized trust, also when they do not have a direct business
connection.
In our proposal, economic operators share data about con-
tainers and the goods within them through the network.
When an economic operator inserts or removes goods from
a container, they send this information to the network as an
encrypted claim. This claim can only be decrypted by the
customs agency at the goods’ country of destination. Whenever
a container changes hands, the involved economic operators
create a signed unencrypted claim specifying the involved
parties, as well as when and where this happened. Any customs
agency can then observe the whole history of the container in
question.
While the entire network can observe the container move-
ments, the package information is only available to the des-
tination agency. This preserves the privacy of the economic
operators. Any alterations or mismatching data about the
container movements can then easily be detected, resulting in
a significant increase in the detection of high-risk containers.
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we propose the
first decentralized system for freight declaration. The mecha-
nism currently in use is not reliable, causing significant loss
in container fraud detection accuracy. Our proposal presents
a secure, privacy-aware, scalable system that solves the fun-
damental trust problem in the container shipment industry.
We present the design details of the system using available
blockchain technology, and introduce the key data partitioning
schema that allows for validation while preserving key privacy
requirements. We believe our proposal will enable a number of
customs agencies and economic operators to start collaborating
in freight declaration without having to trust any one authority
to keep their data secure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the building blocks of our system; in Section IV,
we describe our proposal; in Section V we detail and analyze
our system design; and finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A blockchain is often referred to as a “shared ledger”,
which is a type of distributed database technology. Many
nodes form a peer-to-peer network that maintains this shared
ledger consisting of transactions. These nodes use a consensus
algorithm to determine which data may be added to their copy
of the shared ledger.
Nodes in a blockchain network are responsible for main-
taining the data in the shared ledger. In a permissionless
blockchain, such as Bitcoin [7], any internet-connected com-
puter, capable of understanding the blockchain network’s
protocol can participate in the network. In a permissioned
blockchain, only select nodes may participate.
A shared ledger is a distributed append-only database
present on each node. Data is added to the ledger in the form
of blocks. As a new block is added to the ledger, the nodes
synchronize their copies of the shared ledger by applying the
consensus algorithm. In a public blockchain, anyone can read
the data in the shared ledger, while in a private blockchain,
all or some of the data in the shared ledger is encrypted.
Data is transmitted as transactions from one party to an-
other. In Bitcoin, for example, a transaction consists of some
amount of bitcoin being sent from one address to another [7].
The consensus algorithm determines how each node adds
blocks of new transactions to its copy of the shared ledger.
Examples of consensus algorithms include Byzantine Fault
Tolerance replication [8] and Proof-of-Work [7] (see Table I
for more consensus algorithms).
The key feature of blockchain is that it enables trust without
requiring a central authority, since the truth is determined by
an agreed-upon consensus algorithm. As long as the majority
of a network is not collaborating to pollute the blockchain
with incorrect data, its integrity is guaranteed [7].
After Bitcoin’s rapid rise in popularity in the past few years,
many different blockchain implementations have emerged;
Table I contains a comparison of key aspects of a selection
of such blockchain implementations.
III. RELATED WORK
In recent years, many companies have explored blockchain
projects and prototypes for their respective industries. The
container shipping industry is no exception: A.P. Moller-
Maersk Group (“Maersk” hereinafter) has launched a project
in collaboration with EY (Ernst & Young) and Microsoft
Corporation to launch a marine insurance blockchain that
would help reduce the market’s inefficiencies. A prototype
of the platform has been built on Microsoft Azure to “make
auditing aspects of a shipping supply chain easier, to improve
the tamper-resistance and sharing of data in realtime, and
to enable many different parties to settle upon the terms of
premiums in a more timely fashion” [15]. The platform was to
be deployed in January 2018, but no further news has emerged
about it.
IV. DEFEND- A DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM FOR FREIGHT
DECLARATION
DEFEND is a secure and privacy-preserving decentralized
system for freight declaration. It is built on a blockchain
consisting of a network of certified nodes managed by customs
agencies and economic operators. For DEFEND, we assume
that:
1) Economic operators trust the customs agency of their
own country. DEFEND must be implemented on a
permissioned blockchain to ensure that only verified
economic operators can submit data; the party that issues
the certificates to enable this participation is the customs
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATIONS.
Name Maintainer Permission Consensus GitHub
Chain Chain Inc Permissioned Federated Consensus [6] chain/chain
Corda R3 Permissioned (Custom) corda/corda
Ethereum Ethereum Foundation Both Proof-of-Work [7] ethereum/go-ethereum
Hyperledger Fabric The Linux Foundation, IBM Permissioned (Custom) hyperledger/fabric
Hyperledger Iroha The Linux Foundation Permissioned Byzantine Fault Tolerance [8] hyperledger/iroha
Hyperledger
Sawtooth lake
The Linux Foundation, Intel
Corporation
Both Proof of Elapsed Time [9] hyperledger/sawtooth-core
Kadena Kadena LLC Permissioned ScalableBFT [10] (closed source)
MultiChain Coin Sciences Ltd Permissioned Practical BFT [11] multichain/multichain
OpenChain Coinprism Permissioned Partionned Consensus [12] openchain/openchain
Quorum JPMorgan Chase & Co. Permissioned Raft [13] jpmorganchase/quorum
Ripple Ripple Permissioned Ripple [14] ripple/rippled
Tendermint All In Bits, Inc. Permissioned Byzantine Fault Tolerance [8] tendermint/tendermint
TABLE II
FIELDS STORED IN CONTAINER AND PACKAGE CLAIMS
Field Container claims Package claims
Container ID The ISO 6346 container identification
number [16]
Shipment ID
Concatination of the
ship’s IMO number
[17] and date of
departure in ISO
8601 format [18]
(N/A)
Package ID (N/A)
This package’s
identification number,
defined by the
shipper
From
Economic operator
who has this
container
(N/A)
To
Economic operator
who receives this
container
(N/A)
Sender (N/A)
Person / company
who sends this
package
Receiver (N/A)
Person / company
who receives this
package
Time Time of claim submission in ISO [18] format
Location Longitude and latitude of the location at which
the claim was made
Weight
Weight of this
container, in
kilograms
Weight of this
package, in
kilograms
Action (N/A)
INSERT if package
was inserted into
container; REMOVE if
it was removed”
Contents (N/A) Description of thispackage’s contents
agency of the economic operator’s country of origin; so
they must be trusted to not abuse those certificates.
2) Customs agencies do not trust customs agencies outside
their trade bloc. If there was complete trust between
all customs agencies, a centralized system could be
maintained by one of them; this is not the case.
3) Packages in the system only move by shipping container.
We do not consider the movement of packages by other
modes of transportation.
Based upon these assumptions, we aim to achieve the
following goals with DEFEND:
1) Privacy-preserving: In order to preserve the privacy
of economic operators DEFEND must support visibility re-
strictions on the claims that economic operators post about
the goods they are transporting. Most importantly, economic
operators must not have the ability to read the data in each
others’ claims. Furthermore, only the customs agencies that
are in the trade bloc that the package is destined for should be
able to read the data in the claims, since economic operators
do not necessarily trust every customs agency.
2) Secure: Non-repudiation is key to the security of the
system because we want to make sure an economic operator
can never deny a claim they made. To achieve this DEFEND
must enforce that no economic operator in the system can
alter previously submitted data. Economic operators can only
submit new data when they have been granted access to the
system by customs agencies. Claims about containers should
only be accepted as long as the economic operators that
submitted them are likely interacting with the containers.
3) Scalable: DEFEND must be able to handle enough
transactions to support economic operators submitting trans-
actions at any time. To support a gradual rollout, DEFEND
must be able to track containers and packages even when not
all economic operators in the supply chain participate in the
system.
4) Decentralized: DEFEND must be decentralized to avoid
the shortcomings of a centralized system, such as the potential
for a central database to be manipulated.
A. Protocol Overview
To meet these goals given our assumptions, we define
DEFEND with the following entities:
Algorithm 1 Validate container claim CX = X
c−→ Y | X by operator X about container c, with validation pool Pc.
procedure VALIDATE(CX , Pc)
T ← QUERY(c) . Query blockchain for latest accepted claim about c
if ISCUSTOMS(X) then
ACCEPT(CX ) . Start a new trusted chain
else if T exists and T.to = CX.from then
if CY ∈ Pc and CX.from = CY.from and CX.to = CY.to then . If matching claim by Y exists in Pc
ACCEPT({CX, CY}) . Accept both claims
Pc ← ∅ . Clear Pc of wrong claims to save memory
else . If matching claim by Y does not (yet) exist in Pc
Pc ← Pc ∪ {CX} . Add CX to Pc
else
REJECT(CX ) . Only customs agencies may create new trusted chains
• Economic operators are companies that either insert or
remove packages from containers or transport containers.
Economic operators submit data about the goods that they
are handling to the blockchain network in the form of
claims.
• Customs agencies process these claims and attempt to
reach consensus over whether or not to append submitted
claims to their shared ledger.
• Containers carry one or multiple packages of goods in
them, and are identified by a container number that is
specified according to the ISO 6346 standard [16].
• Packages are identified by the combination of container
number, time and a number identifying them inside the
container.
• Data that is submitted to the blockchain network about
containers or packages are referred to as container claims
and package claims. Claims are data objects that are
signed by an economic operator.
The DEFEND protocol consists of the following three sub-
protocols:
1) The claim submission protocol (Section IV-B) specifies
how economic operators submit data to the blockchain.
It is run on nodes belonging to economic operators.
2) The container claim validation protocol (Section IV-C)
determines whether data submitted by economic opera-
tors is valid and should be added to the shared ledger.
It is run on nodes belonging to customs agencies.
3) The economic operator certification protocol (Section
IV-D) lets customs agencies allow or revoke access to
economic operator in the blockchain network. The cer-
tification protocol is run on nodes belonging to customs
agencies.
We describe each sub-protocol in detail in the following
sections.
B. Claim Submission Protocol
Economic operators submit container claims and package
claims to the network. Container claims tell customs agencies
how containers are moving around the world, and package
claims tell customs agencies what packages of goods are inside
(a) Trusted chain of transactions accepted by the validation algorithm.
(b) Chain of transactions with a new claim waiting for a match in the
validation pool.
(c) Trusted chain of transactions accepted by the validation algorithm with a
new transaction of two claims appended.
Fig. 1. Chains of transactions submitted by economic operators, same colors
refer to the same transaction but made by different parties. a→ b→ c shows
the process of adding a new transaction to the chain.
these containers. The data fields in each of these types of
claims are described in Table II. We depict a container claim
as X c−→ Y | S, where X is the economic operator that hands
container c to economic operator Y . S is the signer of this
claim and must be the same as either X or Y . In the case
that the next operator does not participate in the system, an
economic operator A should claim A c−→  | A. Then, When
an operator B that participates in the system receives c again,
B should claim  c−→ B | B. Before claims are appended to
the shared ledger, customs agencies will run the validation
protocol on claims. Package claims must be encrypted using
the public key of the destination’s customs agency before they
are submitted. Economic operators also add a plain-text field
to package-claims to indicate which customs agency has the
private key that can be used to decrypt the claim.
C. Validation Protocol
Algorithm 1 validates a submitted container claim and
determines whether it should be added to the shared ledger.
It first checks that the economic operator in the from part of
the new claim is actually in possession of the claim. It then
makes sure that both economic operators involved in the claim
agree on what happened. If both of these conditions are true,
the claims are added to the shared ledger.
Given a container claim CX = X
c−→ Y | X , a previously
accepted transaction of A to X , and container c’s validation
pool Pc, Algorithm 1 first queries the blockchain for the latest
claim T about c, as shown in Figure 1a. If T exists and c
has been given to X (which is the case in the example), then
the new claim will be added to the pool of to-be-validated
claims Pc. This scenario is shown in Figure 1b. The claim
X
c−→ Y | X will only be accepted when X c−→ Y | Y is
submitted as shown in Figure 1c. Claims are not required to
be submitted in the order of from-operator then to-operator,
they are always added to Pc when no matching claim is found.
If c has not been given to X in the previous transaction,
the new claim can only be accepted if a customs agency has
submitted the claim to reset the chain. This is required when
operators can not confirm transactions and therefore the trusted
chain is broken.
To save memory in the validation, all claims in the to-be-
validated pool Pc about container c can be cleared when a
claim is accepted for c. Also claims that contain impossible
data can be left out of the validation pool.
D. Certification Protocol
When an economic operator is to be added to the network,
the customs agency in its country can certify that operator. This
is done by generating a digital certificate that is signed by the
newly added economic operator to prove that it has the correct
key. When an economic operator misbehaves, the customs
agency in their country can revoke the operator’s certificate
to restrict access to the blockchain. A revocation list is kept
by the certificate authority, and blockchain nodes verify that
claims have signatures that are generated using certificates that
do not occur in the revocation list.
To add or remove customs agencies from the system, the
customs agency nodes participate in a vote to reach consensus.
V. SYSTEM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
We present a reference implementation for DEFEND, which
implements all the protocols in Sections IV-B, IV-C and
IV-D. As shown in Figure 2, several nodes exist on the
blockchain network. Such nodes may be customs agency nodes
(e.g. nodes run by customs agencies that follow the customs
agencies protocol) or economic operator nodes (e.g. nodes
run by economic operators that follow the economic operator
protocol). These nodes communicate with each other over
gRPC1. Each node has its own web server, which wraps its
functionality in an API, with which it communicates over
1gRPC stands for “gRPC Remote Process Call.” See http://www.grpc.io.
Fig. 2. System architecture for PassPort.
gRPC as well. The clients each communicate with the web
server via REST over HTTP.
In the next sections, we describe each component in detail.
A. System Design
1) Blockchain: We implement the blockchain component
using Hyperledger Fabric [19]. We compare several blockchain
implementations in Table I. Hyperledger Fabric is ideal for our
protocol since it offers a private permissioned blockchain that
supports at least 1,000 transactions per second (see Section
V-B) and allows for a pluggable custom consensus algorithm.
2) Client-Server Interaction: For customs agencies and
economic operators to interact with their peers in the
blockchain network we implement a web server that wraps
networking complexity in a RESTful API. The server receives
API calls from two GUIs: One for economic operators and one
for customs agencies. The customs agencies get an overview
of shipments and containers, along with their estimated risk
level. The GUI for economic operators mainly comprises of
forms that are used to submit claims.
B. Analysis
In Section IV we have put forward some goals for DEFEND
that we have addressed in our implementation. We now
evaluate DEFEND in regards to these requirements.
1) Privacy-preserving: Since package data is encrypted
using asymmetric encryption, only entities that have access
to the private key can read the data. In the case of our
protocol only the customs agency that will receive a package
in their port has access to that private key. This means that
economic operators can never read package data from others,
only customs agencies that they will definitely interact with
can.
2) Secure: To ensure that economic operators can only sub-
mit claims if they have been granted access to the blockchain
network, customs agencies run a certificate authority node,
which grants the economic operators a key, which is part of
their certificate, that they can use to sign their claims. Nodes
in the system will immediately reject claims that are signed
by revoked certificates.
We also introduce a protocol that ensures that economic
operators can only make claims about containers they likely
interacted with; economic operators’ claims are in fact transac-
tions. Economic operator X can therefore only make a claim
about container c if there is another economic operator Y that
made a claim saying, Y provided X with c, and thus confirms
X’s claim.
3) Scalable: Because economic operators must have the
ability to make claims to other economic operators that are not
part of the system we introduce an  operator that represents a
hole in the system. This means that containers can leave and
reenter the system.
For a scalable system we must support sufficient throughput.
We determine the amount of transactions that DEFEND must
support as follows. As of 2012, there are approximately 32.9
million TEU2 shipping containers globally [20] (order of
magnitude: 108). Because a single voyage takes days or weeks
to complete, we generously estimate that a single container
may ‘switch hands’ up to 102 times per year. Each time a
container ‘switches hands’, this requires a transaction. We
estimate the amount of containers switching hands per second
in Equation 1:
108 containers× 102 movesyear
3600× 24× 365 secondsyear
≈ 317 container movessecond (1)
The only nodes that participate in the consensus algorithm
are customs agencies, in the World Customs Organization
182 countries are included[21]. In practice, however, countries
have formed customs unions reducing the need for every
country to run their own node. Currently shipping is dominated
by trade between 24 customs unions[22]. Therefore the system
must be able to support a maximum of approximately 24
nodes.
Our system must also consider what goods go into con-
tainers. If containers have a Full Container Load (FCL), this
is one ‘package’ per container per trip, but they have a Less
than Container Load (LCL), this means multiple ‘packages’
per container per trip.
So DEFEND must have a throughput of at least 103
transactions per second and be able to support around 24
nodes. Hyperledger Fabric has been shown to support this
throughput in recent benchmarks and currently supports up to
16 nodes[23]. With the release of Hyperledger Fabric version
1.1 a promise for higher scalability and performance have been
made[24].
4) Decentralized: Our implementation is decentralized as
it uses a blockchain framework that runs on multiple nodes,
it ensures that no single party controls the data in the system.
By doing so, we remove trust that is required between parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The shipping industry is responsible for the movement of
millions of containers every day. Before these containers may
enter a trade bloc, they must be cleared by the relevant customs
2Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, a standard shipping container size
agency. Because of the high volume of containers that must be
processed each day, customs agencies perform risk analysis to
decide which containers to audit. Risk analysis requires lots
of data, which in the current system is potentially vulnerable
to manipulation and malpractice because it is centralized and
collected by a single authority.
In this work we have presented DEFEND, a secure and
privacy-preserving decentralized system for freight declaration
that does not require the trust between entities that is required
in centralized systems. In DEFEND, economic operators make
claims about the packages of goods and containers with which
they interact, customs agencies validate those claims. Customs
agencies and economic operators participate in a blockchain
that validates this data and stores it in a secure and privacy-
preserving manner. Our two key contributions are a data
partitioning scheme and several protocols to enable this, and
a reference implementation built on Hyperledger Fabric.
Firstly, our data partitioning scheme and protocols allow
DEFEND to take advantage of the powerful validation prin-
ciples enabled by blockchain, while hiding certain parts of
the data to preserve the privacy of the involved economic
operators. In our system, claims about the movement of
containers are unencrypted, and can be validated to ensure that
1) the claim fits in the preceding chain of claims about that
container and that 2) both parties involved in the claim agree
on its contents. Claims about packages are encrypted so that
only the customs agency at the goods’ country of destination
can see them. Hiding this critical link in the data means that
only the appropriate customs agency can recreate the exact
path that goods took to get to their country. This knowledge
can improve the customs agency’s risk analysis.
Secondly, our reference implementation built on Hyper-
ledger Fabric shows that it is possible to implement DEFEND
on a blockchain that meets our privacy-preservation, security,
scalability, and decentralization requirements.
In future work, the combined container claim and package
claim data provided by DEFEND could be used to further
automate customs agencies’ taxation procedures.
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